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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
HAROLD ROBINSON and WIL-
LIAM C. WARD, dba CRYSTAL 
PALACE MARKET, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs. -
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ' 
ASSURANCE CORPORATION, 
LIMITED, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Case No. 
11,308 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for indemnity, based upon the 
refusal of the defendant to afford automobile lia-
bility coverage to the appellants under the loading 
and unloading provision of its policy. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the summary judg-
ment in the lower court as a matter of law and judg-
ment in their favor as a matter of law for the sum 
of $15,000, the amount paid to settle the claim of 
Robert E. Kodat and for their costs incurred in the 
lower court and on this appeal. 
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I 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 10, 1965, Robert E. Kodat filed 
suit against Harold Robinson and William C. Ward 
dba Crystal Palace Market and demanded of them 
damages in the sum of $157,500 arising from per-
sonal injuries he received in an accident which al-
legedly occurred on November 26, 1962, at the prem-
ises of the Crystal Palace Market at 238 South 
Thirteenth East, Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 29). 
Appellants notified defendant Employers' Liability 
Corporation (hereinafter called Employers) of the 
suit and requested that it afford protection against 
Mr. Kodat's claim under the loading and unloading 
coverage on the automobile policy provided to As-
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sociated Foods, Inc. (R. 115). At the time Employ-
ers was notified of the suit, Crystal Palace Market 
also notified its general liability insurer, United 
Pacific Insurance Company (hereinafter called 
United), of the suit of Robert E. Kodat. 
When the case was tendered to Employers, it 
refused to afford coverage, denying Associated Gro-
cer's truck was being used in unloading (R. 15). 
Thereafter, United and Crystal Palace advised 
Employers they deemed Employers coverage was 
primary under the automobile liability "loading and 
unloading" clause and that they would look to Em· 
ployers for indemnity. 
United employed Raymond M. Berry to appear 
and represent Crystal Palace in the defense in Civil 
2 
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No. 160969. Ultimately, after considerable investi-
gation and negotiation the claim of Robert E. Kodat 
was settled for the sum of $15,000. 
Plaintiffs and United are seeking to recover 
the sum of $15,000 paid to Robert E. Kodat plus 
defense costs in the sum of $139.95 incurred in 
preparation of Civil No. 160969 (R. 57). The ap-
pellants have waived any claim for an attorney's 
fee. Plaintiffs claim primary liability was on Em-
ployers under the automobile loading and unloading. 
ACCIDENT 
On November 26, 1962, Robert E. Kodat, em-
ployed as a truck driver by Associated Foods, Inc., 
made a delivery to the Crystal Palace Market (R. 
29) . On this morning he took a load of staple goods 
to Crystal Palace Market at 238 South Thirteenth 
East in Salt Lake City, Utah. He arrived at the 
Crystal Palace Market at about 7 :00 a.m. (R. 30) 
before the Crystal Palace Market was open for busi-
ness and before its employees had arrived at the 
place of business. Mr. Kodat backed his truck up 
to the loading dock at the rear of the store. 
After backing up to the loading dock, Mr. 
Kodat got out of the truck with bills of lading in 
his left hand and started to go up the dock to start 
checking out his load for the delivery at this ad-
dress ( R. 30). He had to check the bills of lading 
against the goods to be delivered to the Crystal Pal-
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ace Market because he had goods for more than one 
store upon the truck (R. 31). 
To get on the dock, Mr. Kodat allegedly used 
the stairway at the north end of the dock. The load-
ing dock is located to the rear or west end of the 
store. It is 5'8" high and has approximately eight 
steps leading from the ground to the top of the dock. 
There is a stairway along the north side of the dock 
running from west to east and there is a handrail 
along the north side of the stairway. This handrail 
is situated so that ordinarily a person walking up 
the stairway would have his left hand on the hand-
rail. 
In his deposition, Mr. Kodat stated that he had 
the bills of lading on a clipboard in his left hand 
and that he slipped as he was going onto the dock to 
check the load for unloading ( R. 31 ) . It was his 
recollection that he fell from about the fourth step. 
He was unable to grasp the handrail because of the 
clipboard in his left hand. There were no known 
eyewitnesses to the accident and the store was not 
not scheduled to open until 7 :45 a.m. when em-
ployees arrived at work (R. 2). Mr. Kodat's load 
was picked up at 6 :00 a.m. at the Associated Gro-
cer's warehouse and it was the practice for truck 
drivers to unload their trucks at the markets, in-
cluding the Crystal Palace Market. 
INJURY 
In the accident Mr. Kodat claimed to have re-
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ceived the following injuries: ( 1) a cracked wrist; 
and (2) a back injury (Page 8, Kodat Deposition). 
For the back injury he required extensive sur-
gical service. He was operated on by various doc-
tors and the major operation involved a spinal fusion 
at L-4, L-5, S-1, and subsequently a second oper-
ation was required at this same site to repair the 
fusion. 
MEDICAL SPECIALS 
Mr. Kodat claimed the following medical spe-
cials: 
L.D.S. Hospital --------------------------------$372.85 
Dr. Madison Thomas, 
Psychiatrist -------------------------------- 130.00 
A. R. Reynolds---------------------------------- 17.33 
Dr. Burke Snow ------------------------------ 364.00 
Dr. Dalton ---------------------------------------- 150.00 
Dr. Capel ------------------------------------------ 435.00 
Pharmacy ---------------------------------------- 6.80 
Cottonwood Hospital (estimated) __ 350.00 
$1,843.98 
(R. 59) 
LOSS OF EARNINGS 
Mr. Kodat claimed to have been making $100 
per week and estimated his loss of wages as approxi-
mately $5,000 (R. 37). 
STATE INSURANCE FUND 
At the time of the accident, Mr. Kodat was cov-
ered by workmen's compensation insurance with the 
State Insurance Fund. The State Insurance Fund 
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spent $10,269.84 on his behalf for compensation and 
medical. Thereafter, the State Insurance Fund 
joined with the plaintiff in instituting Civil No. 
160969 against Harold Robinson and William C. 
Ward dba Crystal Palace Market (R. 59). 
RESPONDENT'S LIABILITY COVERAGE 
Employers was the carrier for the automobile 
liability insurance on the trucks owned, operated 
and used by Associated Foods, Inc. Their policy af-
forded coverage in the sum of $300,000 for injuries 
to any one person in any one accident on the date 
of the injury to Mr. Kodat. The pertinent provisions 
of defendant's insurance policy other than the limits 
are as follows: 
Insuring agreement 1 provided: 
"I. Coverage A - Bodily Injury Liability 
To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which 
the insured shall become legally obligated to 
pay as damages because of bodily injury, 
sickness or disease, including death at any 
time resulting therefrom, sustained by any 
person, caused by accident and arising out of 
the ownership, maintenance or use of the au-
tomobile. 
II. Defense, Settlement, Supplementary Pay-
ments 
With respect to such insurance as is afforded 
by this policy for bodily injury liability and 
6 
for property damage liability, the company 
shall 
(a) defend any suit against the insured al-
leging such injury, sickness, disease or de-
struction and seeking damages on account 
thereof, even if such suit is groundless, false 
or fraudulent; but the company may make 
such investigation, negotiation and settlement 
of any claim or suit as it deems expedient. 
III. Definition of Insured 
(a) With respect to the insurance for bodily 
injury liability and for property damage lia-
bliity, the unqualified word 'insured' includes 
the names insured, and, if the named insured 
is an individual, his spouse, if a resident of 
the same household, and also includes any per-
son while using the automobile and any person 
or organization legally responsible for the use 
thereof, provided the actual use of the automo-
bile is by the named insured or such spoose 
or with the permission of either. The insur<Uic e 
with respect to any person or organization 
other than the named insured or such spouse 
does not apply: 
( 1) to any person or organization or to any 
agent or employee thereof, operating an auto-
mobile sales agency, repair shop, service sta-
tion, storage garage or public parking place, 
with respect to any accident arising out of the 
operation thereof, but this provision does not 
apply to a resident of the same household as 
the named insured, to a partnership in which 
such resident or the named insured is a part-
ner, or to any partner, agent or employee of 
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such resident or partnership. 
(2) to any employee with respect to mJury 
to or sickness, disease or death of another 
employee of the same employer, injured in 
the course of such employment in an accident 
arising out of the maintenance or use of the 
automobile in the business of such employer." 
With respect to the conditions, Section 26, Pur-
poses of Use defines: 
" ( c) Use of the automobile for the purposes 
stated includes the loading and unloading 
thereof." 
Condition 6 reads: 
"Severability of Interests. Coverages A and 
B. The term 'the insured' is used severally 
and not collectively, but the inclusion herein 
of more than one insured shall not operate to 
increase the limits of the company's liability." 
(R. 16-18). 
GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY 
United, under policy No. CLP 52602, effective 
from 9-10-62 to 1-10-63, under Coverage A, afforded 
Crystal Palace Market $50,000 coverage for injuries 
to any one person arising from any one accident. 
This policy, like the policy of Employers, provides 
for supplementary defense costs. 
The other insurance clause of the general lia-
bility policy of United is as follows: 
"14. Other Insurance - Coverages A and B. 
8 
If the insured has other insurance against a 
loss covered by this policy, the company shall 
not be ~iable under this policy for a greater 
proportion of such loss than the applicable 
limit of liability stated in the declaration bears 
to the total applicable limit of liability of all 
valid and collectible insurance against such 
loss, provided, however, that the insurance 
shall (a) not apply, Division 2, to the extent 
that any valid and collectible insurance, wheth-
er on a primary, excess of contingent basis, is 
available to the insured with respect to loss 
arising oitt of the ownership, maintenance, 
operation, use, loading or unloading of (1) 
any automobile at the premises or the ways 
im11iediately adjoining, or (2) watercraft, 
and (b) be excess insurance ( 1) over any 
other valid and collectible insurance with re-
spect to temporary substitute, hired or non-
owned automobiles, or * * * ." (R. 25). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE INJURY TO ROBERT E. KODAT AROSE 
FROM THE LOADING AND UNLOADING OF 
THE TRUCK INSURED BY RESPONDENT. 
Loading and unloading are words of expansion. 
They were intended by the underwriters to cover 
liability when the truck was stationary, otherwise 
the phrase is meaningless in the policy. 
Loading begins when the truck crew receives 
the merchandise at the Associated Grocer's ware-
house and the unloading operation is not completed 
until the merchandise is removed from the truck 
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by the driver of the truck or employees of the con-
signee. 
Any use of the truck between the time loading 
is starting and prior to the completion of unloading 
is covered. 
Each case must be considered with respect to 
the facts involved. Utah has adopted the modern 
liberal view in interpreting the loading and unload-
ing phrase. 
In Pacific Auto Insurance Co. vs. Commercial 
Casualty Insurance Co., ( 1945), 108 Utah 500, 161 
P.2d 423, coverage was afforded under the automo-
ble liability coverage for claims being made by a 
blind man who had walked into an open manhole. 
In this case employees of a brewing company were 
delivering regularly to a restaurant. They parked 
the truck at the curb, took some kegs of beer off 
the truck and placed them on the sidewalk. There-
after, the truck crewman went into the building and 
opened the manhole or trapdoor in the sidewalk to 
which the kegs of beer were loaded into the basement 
of the building by means of an elevator. While the 
beer kegs were being taken into the basement, the 
blind man fell into the open manhole. The question 
for determination was whether under the policy of 
insurance the lowering of kegs into the basement 
constituted a part of the process of unloading the 
truck. Answering the question in the affirmative 
the court said: 
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"The policy of the plaintiff was written, not 
to cover the trucks, not to protect the trucks 
but to protect and cover the risks of the Brew: 
~ng Company's business in the operation of 
its trucks. The policy specifies that the truck 
is to be used only in the business of the Brew-
ing Company, including loading and unload-
ing of the trucks in making commercial de-
liveries. Commercial delivery as a matter of 
common knowledge includes taking the arti-
cles from their usual place of storage or as-
sembly to the place of destination and turning 
them over to the control or possession of the 
purchaser or receiver. Sometimes delivery 
may be made by depositing things on the side-
walk or on a platform or other convenient 
place. That, however, is usually indicated by 
the custom of the business or agreement of 
the parties. Normally a delivery is not com-
pleted until the deliveror has finished his 
handling of the article, has completed his as-
signment or task of putting the articles into 
the possession of the receiving party." 
The foregoing case also holds there must be 
some causal relationship between the use of the 
insured vehicle and the accident for which recovery 
is sought. The case does show that the injury or 
damage need not be directly caused by the truck or 
automobile and that the requirement is satisfied, 
as to causal relationship, if there is some connection 
with the injury and the use of the vehicle. 
Since the words loading and unloading are words 
of expansion in a liability policy, most courts cor-
rectly find coverage for omnibus insureds for acci-
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dents arising out of loading and unloading hazards, 
without regard to whether or not the injury arose 
from being struck or injured by the truck. 
Wagnian vs. American Fidelity & Casualty 
Co., ( 1952), 304 N.Y. 490, 109 N.E. 2d 592, is a 
leading case which has attracted a lot of comment. 
In this case a stranger claimed coverage under the 
automobile liability policy issued to the owner of the 
truck for injury caused to him by another stranger. 
Wagman, the stranger seeking coverage, was an em-
ployee of Bond Stores in New York and Bond Stores 
were insured under a general liability policy which 
did not cover as an insured, their employees. A truck-
ing concern was insured for automobile liability cov-
erage with American Fidelity & Casualty Co. and 
this policy covered as an insured any person using 
(loading and unloading) the automobile and any 
person legally responsible for such use. The truck 
insured was employed by Bond Stores to transport 
garments from one of its stores to another. The 
truck was parked at the curb in front of a store at 
the time of the accident. Two of Bond's employees 
rolled a rack of clothing across the sidewalk to the 
curb line and garments from the rack were handed 
to a helper inside the truck who arranged them on a 
rack in the truck. The driver and the helper were 
employeers of the trucker and did not leave the truck. 
None of Bonds employees entered the truck or 
brought garments further than the curb line. Bond's 
store manager, Mr. Wagman, the stranger who 
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sought coverage, was on the sidewalk counting aI'ltl 
checking garnients and supervising the pickup but 
did not participate in the actual movement of gar-
ments. While the manager, \Vagman, was on his way 
back to the store to check for further goods to be 
shipped, he bumped into a pedestrian, causing her to 
fall on the sidewalk and sustain serious personal in-
jories. A declaratory judgment action was instituted 
by Wagman and he was held to be an insured under 
the omnibus clause of the truck policy because of 
the loading and unloading clause of the policy. The 
court said loading and unloading embraces not only 
immediate transfer of goods to and from the vehicle 
but the complete operation of transferring the gar-
ments between the vehicle and the place to or from 
which they are to be moved and such coverage was 
not precluded because of the fact that no employee 
of the trucker was involved because the omnibus 
clause extends coverage to anyone using the truck 
and the manager was so using it at the time of the 
accident. 
McCloskey and Co. vs. Allstate Insurance Co., 
(1966), U.S. Cir. Ct. App., Dist. of Col., 358 F.2d 
544, discloses the argument generally made against 
affording coverage. A favorite argument of the au-
tomobile liability insurer for not affording coverage 
for loading and unloading is that the accident was 
not caused by the truck. In this case Allstate argued 
the general contractor was not entitled to coverage 
under the auto liability clause for loading and un-
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loading because Mawyer, the foreman for the sub-
contractor who was injured, was charged by the 
contractor with unloading steel at the time he was 
struck. Mawyer was struck by a clamshell bucket 
of a crane owned by McCloskey at a time Mawyer 
was supervising the placing of timbers on the ground 
to form a platform for the steel to be placed upon 
once actual unloading was started. The lower court 
ruled against McCloskey and Company, but on ap-
peal it was reversed and the court said that where all 
major preparatory acts, except the attachment of a 
sling to a crane, were under way or completed, that 
loading and unloading had commenced within the 
meaning of the standard loading and unloading 
clause even though no steel had been moved. 
Continental Casualty Co. vs. Du/ fy et al., 
(1966) 26 A.D. 2d 60, 272 NYS 2d 470, shows that 
it is causally connected if the accident arises because 
the truck is on the premises to be unloaded without 
regard to whether or not the truck is a tool or piece 
of equipment causing the accident. In this case use 
of the truck did not cause the accident. However, 
the court held there was coverage for the owner of 
the tavern under the truck owner's liability policy. 
In this case the seller of whiskey had a driver mak-
ing a delivery at a tavern at a time when wind blew 
doors over striking the driver. Prior to starting the 
unloading the driver had opened the doors of the 
tavern and there was no bar to brace them so they 
would not blow over. The court had no difficulty 
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in finding a direct causal connection between the 
accident and unloading and noted that if the driver 
had not been on the premises, the doors would not 
have struck him. 
Float-Away Door Co. vs. Continental Casualty 
Co., (1967) 5th Cir. 372 F.2d 701, supports the view 
that the words loading and unloading are words of 
expansion. In this case Float-Away loaded a trailer 
owned by Dance at a factory in Georgia. Continen-
tal had the auto liability coverage on Dance. The 
trailer was delivered to Universal Manufacturing 
Co. in Ohio. At the time it was being unloaded, an 
employee of Universal was seriously injured. The 
employee sued Dance and Float-A way for negligence. 
Continental admitted coverage for Dance but de-
clined to defend Float-Away. Action was commenced 
by Float-Away for declaratory judgment and the 
court held that Float-Away was using the truck and 
entitled to coverage under Dance's automobile lia-
bility policy even though the accident occurred in 
Ohio many miles and many hours from the time 
Float-Away did the loading. 
In Hertz Corp. vs. Bellin, (1967), 280 A.D. 2d 
1101, 284 NYS 2d 140, an employee was returning 
to the truck with an empty dolly and struck a per-
son injuring him. The court held there was coverage 
for injury under the loading and unloading and that 
the phrase "loading and unloading" covered the en-
tire operation of making pickups and deliveries. 
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lVashington Insurance Corp. vs. Maher, (PA 
1942), 31 Del. Co. 755, 160 ALR 1272, involves the 
movement of beer. In this case a truck driver parked 
his vehicle in front of a restaurant so he might 
remove beer kegs from the basement. He went into 
the basement, rolled the kegs along the floor to a 
point near the sidewalk pavement where he left the 
kegs at the foot of the stairs which led from the 
basement to the sidewalk. He went up the stairs and 
pushed the sidewalk door open and as the door was 
pushed open it struck a pedestrian causing injury. 
This was held covered because the truck driver was 
on the premises to make a delivery and that this 
was sufficient causal connection without the injured 
party being struck by the truck. 
Thompson Heating Corp. vs. Hardware Indem-
nity Insurance Co., (1944) 74 Ohio App. 350, 58 
NE2d 809, involved injuries to a pedestrian who 
tripped over a hose over a parked truck across the 
sidewalk into a building into which granulated rock 
wool insulation was being blown. At the time of the 
accident the blower was unattached to the truck, but 
nevertheless, the provision for loading and unload-
ing was held to cover the claims being made. 
Bobier vs. National Casualty Co., (1944), 143 
Ohio St. 215, 54 NE2d 798, is another Ohio case 
showing that in an expansion clause of this type 
you endeavor to interpret the policy to afford cov-
erage. In this case the insured's employees were 
carrying a stove from the furniture store of the third 
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party preparing to load it into one of the insured's 
trucks and in doing so damaged a davenport, the 
property of the store owner. The court said there 
was coverage and stated: 
'.'From a considerCI:tion of the entire policy, 
it seems clear that it was the intention of the 
parties to cover liability arising in some inci-
dences when the truck was stationary. Unless 
this be true, the provision as to loading and 
unloading is meaningless as it could hardly 
be claimed that loading or unloading would 
take place while the truck was in motion .... 
We think that the loading begins when the 
employees of the plaintiff connected with the 
truck receive the article as part of the con-
tinuing operaton, place it on the truck. ... " 
Raff el vs. Travelers Indemnity Co., ( 1954), 
141 Conn. 389, 106 A.2d. 716, involved a situation 
where a store sent a roll of linoleum which would con-
tain more than the amount needed to do a job with 
the understanding that it would call back and pick 
up the remainder. The roll, about six feet long and 
weighing two to three hundred pounds, was delivered 
to an enclosed porch and stood on end near the 
front door of the house. Some hours later it fell and 
seriously injured a ten year old girl. This was a 
case of first impression in Connecticut, and the court 
held there was coverage in adopting the completed 
operations rule. 
The causal connection was that the truck 
brought the linoleum to the premises. 
17 
Industrial Indemnity Co. vs. General Insurance 
Co. of America, ( 1962), 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 568, holds 
there is coverage where the accident was not caused 
by the truck. In this case a truck insured under an 
automobile liability policy was delivering a load of 
concrete pipe to the job site. The truck driver re-
quested and received the assistance of a crane owned 
by the contractor which was operated by the con-
tractor's employee to effect the unloading. The truck 
driver affixed a pipe hook to a section of pipe and 
then signaled the crane operator to lift the pipe. 
While the section of pipe was being removed, the 
truck driver, standing on the bed of the truck, was 
injured when struck by a section of pipe being lifted 
by the crane. Thereafter, the truck driver brought 
action against the crane operator and the contractor, 
and they in turn sought coverage from the liability 
carrier on the truck. 
In the declaratory judgment suit which fol-
lowed, the District Court of Appeals in California 
held: 
"1. That a person loading or unloading the 
truck is using the truck within the meaning 
of the automobile liability policy covering the 
truck and is, therefore, an additional insured 
under the policy. 
2. That while the truck here did not form a 
legal basis of liability to the truck driver, the 
truck insurer was obligated to def end and 
indemnify the crane operator and !ts ?W~~rs 
as additional insureds because their hab1hty 
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to the truck driver was incurred while using 
the truck. 
3. That while the contractor's liability policy 
covered the contractor, the negligent crane op-
erator was not covered by the policy as an ad-
ditional insured and, therefore, that the truck 
policy under which the crane operator was 
covered was primary since the only insurance 
company covering a negligent employee is 
deemed primary over a policy covering a per-
son vicariously liable so that the truck insurer 
was obligated to furnish a defense to the ac-
tion against the crane operator and its own-
ers." 
Travelers Insurance Co. vs. W. F. Saunders 
Sons, Inc., ( 1963), 18 A.D. 2d 162, 238 NYS 2d 
495, shows the injury did not have to be caused by 
the truck for coverage to be effective for loading 
and unloading. In this case a workman was injured 
when a crane owned by a subcontractor tipped over 
while being used to convey concrete in a bucket from 
a transit truck to the place of pour. The court ap-
plied the completed operations test and stated that 
since the truck had to necessarily remain at the place 
it was until the unloading was completed, it was 
necessarily being used in the unloading process. The 
case is significant because it shows coverage exists 
when the truck is at the premises of the consignee 
awaiting for work to be done that is customarily a 
part of the unloading process. 
Drew Chemical Corp. vs. American Fore Loyal-
ty Group, (1966), 90 N.J. Supp. 582, 218 A.2d 875, 
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is another case where the truck is in the un-
loading process even though actual unloading has 
not started. In this case Byford, an employee of 
Nappi, the owner of the tank truck company, drove 
the truck to the premises of Drew Chemical for the 
purpose of delivering a fatty acid liquid. Byford 
was injured while steam under pressure was being 
run through Drew's 18 foot hose to dislodge an im-
pediment so that the unloading of the acid could 
begin. Byford was covered by workmen's compen-
sation from his employer, Nappi. Byford instituted 
suit against Drew, alleging Evans, an employee of 
Drew, was negligent in causing the accident. The 
policy involved defined use of the automobile to in-
clude the loading and unloading thereof. The court 
construed the meaning and scope of the words load-
ing and unloading using the completed operations 
test as used by this court in Pacific Auto Insurance 
Co. vs. Commercial Casualty Insurance Co., supra, 
and said that all that was necessary to establish cov-
erage was that the act or omission resulted in an 
injury which was necessary to carry out the unload-
ing of the truck. 
Loading begins when the truck which receives 
the merchandise to place aboard. The unloading op-
eration does not end until the merchandise is removed 
from the truck. In this case the loading began when 
Mr. Kodat received the merchandise at the Associ-
ated Grocers warehouse on the morning of the acci-
dent. It was not ended until all merchandise from 
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the truck had been unloaded. Any use of the truck 
prior to the completion of the unloading process is 
within defendant's coverage. 
Parking the truck and taking the bill of lading 
up to check out the load were preparatory acts neces-
sary to complete in the unloading process. The back-
ing of the truck up to the dock and the parking of 
it was a start of the preparatory act of unloading. 
The injury to Mr. Kodat was causally connected to 
the unloading. Except for being on the premises to 
unload the truck the accident would not have hap-
pened. 
Kodat's injury in this case was casually con-
nected with the unloading in the same manner as 
Mawyer's injury was casually connected in McClos-
key and Co. vs. Allstate Insurance Co., supra, when 
Mawyer was placing timber to unload steel upon. It 
is causally connected just as Duffy's injury was in 
the case of Continental Casualty Co. vs. Duffy, supra, 
when he was struck by the tavern doors. 
If Kodat had not been carrying the bill of lad-
ing in his left hand he could have used the hand rail 
and the accident would not have happened. As such, 
for this reason it is not reasonable to think unloading 
was not causally connected to the accident. 
Some courts have taken the view that under 
the facts as stated in Pacific Auto Insurance Co. vs. 
Commercial Security Insurance Co., supra; Wagman 
vs. American Fidelity and Casualty Co., supra; Mc-
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Closkey and Co. vs. Allstate Insurance Co., supra; 
Continental Casualty Co. vs. Duffy, supra, and this 
case, there would be no casual connection to the ac- ' 
cident with unloading. The courts that have taken 
this narrow view of loading and unloading have erred 
in that they are considering coverage only afforded 
if the injury is proximately caused by the loading 
or unloading process. This narrow view is not neces-
sary as the words loading and unloading are words 
of expansion, and it is only necessary to find some 
causal connection with loading and unloading to 
afford coverage. Nothing in the automobile liability 
policy requires the accident be proximately caused ( 
by use of the truck. ~ 
POINT II. 
THE AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY POLICY AF-
FORDS PRIMARY COVERAGE FOR LOADING 
AND UNLOADING. 
The other insurance clause in United's general 
liability policy provides that its policy will be excess 
coverage over any other valid and collectible auto 
liability insurance. United's general liability policy 
provided that any insurance afforded by its policy 
should not apply to the extent there was any valid 
and collectible insurance available to the insured 
with respect to loss arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance, operation, use, loading or unloading 
of any automobile at the premises or the ways im-
mediately adjoining. 
Russell vs. Poulson, ( 1966), 18 Utah 2d 157, 
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417 P.2d 658, discusses the effect of an excess other 
insurance clause. In this case the court sustained 
the effect of the excess other insurance clause hold-
ing that the policy on the vehicle in which the injured 
plaintiff was riding was primary. 
POINT III. 
EMPLOYERS HAS WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO 
QUESTION THE REASONABLENESS OF THE 
SETTLEMENT. 
The law does not look with favor upon insurers 
who breach their duty to their insureds. Defending 
an insured is an obligation that insurance companies 
should be encouraged to accept and discouraged from 
avoiding. Good faith requires that an insurance com-
pany not be given two opportunities to avoid an 
obligation. To permit an insurer to question the 
reasonableness of a settlement made by an insured 
after the insured has had to defend because of a 
breach of duty is not reasonable. 
The question of reasonableness of the settlement 
made only relates to the question of indemnification. 
Once a duty to defend is breached the insurer be-
comes liable to indemnify the insured for the entire 
loss resulting from the breach. The insurer cannot 
rely upon the policy provisions it has breached to 
limit is obligation, duty, or liability. 
This is a case involving a breach of contract. 
Damages for breach of contract are based upon the 
concept of what damages were reasonably forseeable 
and what loss would naturally and usually follow. 
23 
In Pacific Coast Title Insurance Co. vs. Hartford ' 
AccUlent & Indemnity Co., (1958), 7 Utah 2d 377, 
325 P.2d 906, this court said following Hadley vs. 
Baxendale, 9 Exch. 41, 157 Eng. Rep. ( 1854) and 
Restatement of Contracts, Section 330 stated: 
"The rule as to what damages are recoverable ' 
for breach of contract is based upon the con-
cept of reasonable forseeability that loss of 
such general character would result from the 
breach. Therefore, to be compensable, the loss 
must result in the breach in the natural and , 
usual course of events, so that it can fairly 
and reasonably be said that if the minds of 
parties had adverted to breach when the con-
tract was made, the loss of such character 
would have been within their contemplation." ' 
Ninety-five per cent of all personal injury law-
suits are settled. It seems as a matter of law it must 
have been within the contemplation of the parties 
that the insured would settle a $157,500 lawsuit for 
$15,000 rather than run the expense of trial and 
the possibility or probability of a higher judgment 
being rendered. 
Recent cases support the proposition that an in-
surance company is liable for all damages that fol-
low from a consequence of a breach. 
In California in 1955 in Richie vs. Anchor Cas-
ualty Co., (1955), 286 P.2d 1000, the District Court 
of Appeals held the insured was entitled to make a 
compromise settlement after the duty to defend was 
breached by the insurer. 
24 
Richie vs. Anchor Casualty Co., supra, is au-
thority an insured does not have to risk trial. 
Since 1955, the law regarding the duty to in-
demnify and make the insured whole has advanced 
in many jurisdictions. 
In Theodore vs. Zurich General Accident & Lia-
bility Insurance Co., (1961), Alas. 364 P.2d 51, an 
insured was faced with a $1,000,000 lawsuit on a 
claim obstensibly from facts known to be within the 
te1·ms of the policy coverage. However, the insurer 
ref used to take part in litigation and the insured 
reached a settlement by way of confession of a judg-
ment in the amount of $20,000 without trial. The 
court said that since Zurich had the obligation to 
defend and refused to do so, the amount of the set-
tlement made by entry of judgment became binding 
against Zurich both as to the extent and existence 
of liability. Therefore, Zurich did not have the right 
to show the settlement was unreasonable because 
Theodore was not covered by the employer's liability 
section of the policy. 
On October 25, 1966, the Supreme Court of the 
State of California decided two cases of importance. 
In Lowell vs. Maryland Casualty Co., (1966), 54 
Cal. Rptr. 116, 419 P.2d 180, the insured refused 
to defend as the pleadings asserted an assault and 
battery. However, there was a defense of self de-
fense and if true, this would make the claim of the 
plaintiff groundless. The Supreme Court in revers-
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ing a judgment in favor of the insurer stated the 
sole issue should be on damages. There was an issue 
of fact because attorneys' fees were being claimed. 
In the other California case, Gray vs. Zurich, 
(1966), 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 419 P.2d 168, Zurich In-
surance Co. presented the insured with a dilemma. 
In this case Dr. Gray, the insured, was charged with 
willfully, maliciously, brutally and intentionally as-
saultng a Mr. Jones in Missouri. Dr. Gray notified 
Zurich of the case and requested that it defend him. 
Zurich refused to defend on the ground the com-
plaint alleged an intentional tort outside the cover-
age. Dr. Gray claimed that he did not inten-
tionally, willfully or maliciously injure Jones. He 
claimed self defense for his acts. The Supreme Court 
of California, sitting in bank, held there was a duty 
to defend and that Zurich had breached its duty. The 
court said: 
"Since modern procedural rules focus on facts 
of the case rather than theory of recovery in 
the complant, the duty to defend should be 
fixed by facts the insurer learns from the co!ll· 
plaint, the insured or other sources. An m-
surer, therefore, bears a duty to defend an 
insured whenever it ascertains facts which 
give rise to the potential liability und~r t!1e 
policy. In the instant case the complamt it-
self, as well as the facts known to the insurer, 
sufficiently apprised the insurer of these pos-
sibilities hence we need not set out when a.nd 
upon what other occasions the duty of an ~n­
sured to ascertain such possibilities otherwise 
arising." 
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Dr. Gray was unsuccessful in his claim of self 
defense. Thereafter, Zurich Insurance Co. claimed 
that it had no duty to indemnify Dr. Gray for the 
sum owed Mr. Jones inasmuch the defense of self 
defense was not accepted. The court said that Zurich 
could not whittle down its obligation to the plaintiff 
on the theory that the plaintiff himself was of such 
limited financial ability that he could not afford to 
employ able counsel or present every reasonable de-
fense or to carry his cause to the highest court hav-
ing jurisdiction. The court reversed the judgment 
in favor of Zurich in the intermediate court and in-
structed damages to be fixed by including the amount 
of the judgment in the Jones suit against Gray, the 
costs, expenses and attorney's fees incurred defend-
ing such suit without regard to the question of rea-
sonableness. The court was told to take evidence on 
damages only as to the amount of the judgment in 
Jones' suit, the costs, the expenses and attorney's 
fees incurred in defending such suit. 
Quoting from Arenson vs. National Auto & Cas-
ualty Insurance Co., (1957), 48 Cal. 2d 528, 539, 
310 P.2d 961, 968, the court said: 
"Having defaulted such agreement the com-
pany is manifestly bound to reimburse its in-
sured for the full amount of any obligation 
reasonably incurred by him. It will not be 
allowed to defeat or whittle down its obliga-
tion on the theory that the plaintiff himself 
was of such limited financial ability that he 
could not afford to employ able counsel or to 
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p~esent every rea.sonable defense, or to carry 
his c~u~e ;o the high~st court having jurisdic-
ton, · · . Sustammg such a theory * * * 
would tend * * * to encourage insurance com-
p~nies to si~ilar disayowals of responsibility 
with everythmg to gam and nothing to lose." 
In Missionaries of the Company of Mary, Inc. 
vs. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., ( 1967), Conn., 
230 A.2d 21, the insurer breached its contract by 
an unqualified refusal to def end an action against l 
its insured claiming the claim was within an exclu- ! 
sion of the policy. The case was settled and an action 
was brought for the amount of this settlement plus 
expenses and attorney's fees. The court said that 
where a breach to def end existed the insurance com- I 
I 
pany could not thereafter question the settlement or • 
seek to show that it had no duty to indemnify as 
the loss was excluded and allowed recovery in full 
for the amount of the settlement from the insurer. 
In Kong Yick Investment Co. vs. Maryktnd Cas-
ualty Co., (1967), ____ Wash. ____ , 423 P.2d 935, a 
claim was made against Kong Yick arising from a 
pedestrian being struck by a pane of glass which 
fell from Kong Yick's building. Maryland Casualty 
Co. refused to accept the defense claiming its policy 
did not cover the sidewalk at the location where 
the accident occurred. The Washington Court held 
that the policy was ambiguous and that in such a 
situation the insured was entitled to coverage. Kong 
Yick's attorney settled the claim of the pedestrian, 
Somerville, and brought suit to recover the amount 
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of the settlement. The court held it was the defend-
ant Maryland Casualty's duty to defend the Somer-
ville action and that having failed to do so it was 
liable to the plaintiff to make the plaintiff whole 
and directed judgment for the plaintiff be entered 
in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. 
In this case it is admitted that the sum of $15,-
000 was paid to Kodat and that the legal costs were 
expended. In the lower court appellants withdrew 
their claim for attorney's fees to eliminate the fac-
tual question on reasonableness of attorney's fees. 
Settlement of the lawsuit of Kodat vs. Crystal 
Palace Market was a consequence that Employers 
could reasonably contemplate as arising from its 
breach to defend. Therefore, as a matter of law 
Employers should be barred from trying to profit 
from the breach of failing to def end by claiming 
the amount of the settlement was unreasonable. 
If Employers is allowed to question the amount 
of the settlement, it and other insurance companies 
will have reason to believe nothing is to be lost and 
something may be gained by ref using a defense. 
CONCLUSION 
If an insured has both an automobile liability 
policy and a general liability polcy which will afford 
defenses, the insured has a right to expect both com-
panies will be anxious and willing to def end. An in-
surance company should never be given an oppor-
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tunity to gain as a result of breaching an obligation 
to an insured. 
The lower court should be reversed and directed 
as a matter of law to enter judgment in favor of 
the appellants for the amount of the settlement and 
legal costs incurred because : 
1. The accident occurred during the prepara-
tory process for unloading. 
2. The accident was causally connected with 1 
unloading. 
1 
3. The entire operation of delivery of goods is 
part of unloading of the unloading process. 
4. Employers coverage was primary. 
5. Employers breached its duty to defend. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WORSLEY, SNOW & 
CHRISTENSEN 
Raymond M. Berry 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Appellants 
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NOTICE 
Raymond M. Berry, being first duly sworn, 
states that he served two copies of the Appellants' 
Brief upon the defendant by mailing same to Shirley 
P. Jones, Jr., Attorney at Law, 510 American Oil 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, by United States 
mail, postage prepaid, this ________ day of ______________________ , 
1968. 
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